Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts
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Cited by:
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2016.
"Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2046R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
- Antón, Miguel & Ederer, Florian & Gine, Mireia & Schmalz, Martin, 2018. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin C. Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6178, CESifo.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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More about this item
Keywords
contract; Joneses; manager; pay performance; relative;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2016-10-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2016-10-09 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-10-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2016-10-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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