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Optimal regulation under unknown supply of distributed generation

Author

Listed:
  • Rob Aalbers

    (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

  • Viktoria Kocsis
  • Victoria Shestalova

Abstract

As distributed generation (DG) continues to expand, larger low-voltage networks will be required in the future. However, regulated distribution network operators (DNOs) need to invest in new infrastructure without knowing a relevant determinant of network costs, the future amount of DG. Due to uncertainty, optimal network capacity needs to reflect the expected demand for capacity over all possible DG states. Therefore, not all capacity will be used if a low level of DG occurs. Optimal regulation that is set under asymmetric information about future DG needs to create incentives for the DNO to invest in this 'excess capacity' and also encourage optimal network utilization. In this case, an option menu that includes fixed fees and positive network charges on DG-producers fulfills these requirements and implements the first-best optimum. On the contrary, price-cap and revenue-cap regulation lead to either underinvestment or high information rents to the DNO.

Suggested Citation

  • Rob Aalbers & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova, 2011. "Optimal regulation under unknown supply of distributed generation," CPB Discussion Paper 192, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:192
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Agrell, Per J. & Bogetoft, Peter & Mikkers, Misja, 2013. "Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 656-666.
    2. Arie ten Cate, 2012. "The socially optimal energy transition in a residential neighbourhood in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 222, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Arie ten Cate, 2012. "The socially optimal energy transition in a residential neighbourhood in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 222.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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