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Issues and Options in the Economic Regulation of European Network Security

Author

Listed:
  • Tooraj Jamasb

    (Durham University Business School)

  • Rabindra Nepal

    (School of Economics, University of Queensland)

Abstract

Incentive regulation needs to adapt to the emerging changes in the operating environment of the electricity networks and take into account the security of these. This paper assesses the current issues and options in economic regulation of network security across the European electricity systems. An output oriented incentive regulatory approach combines the efficiency promoting mechanisms in a revenue cap framework with output based incentives such as better provision of network security. Thus, incentive regulation is destined to move from pursuing the optimal to being more practical. The RIIO regulatory framework in the UK and the service quality regulation in Italy provide good examples of application of output-based regulation. We also propose an output-based approach for regulation of network security, which accounts for the risks from natural, accidental and malicious threats. We conclude that regulation for network security may also involve looking beyond economic network regulation and focus on the wider security policy and regulation interface considering the risks facing the electricity networks.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Tooraj Jamasb & Rabindra Nepal, 2014. "Issues and Options in the Economic Regulation of European Network Security," Working Papers EPRG 1405, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nepal, Rabindra & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2015. "Incentive regulation and utility benchmarking for electricity network security," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 117-127.
    2. Lavarenne, Jean & Shwageraus, Eugene & Weightman, Michael, 2016. "Accountability feedback assessments for improving efficiency of nuclear regulatory institutions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 274-288.
    3. Nepal, Rabindra & Foster, John, 2015. "Electricity networks privatization in Australia: An overview of the debate," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 12-24.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    network security; exceptional events; incentive regulation; output-based;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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