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Household behavior and individual autonomy: An extended Lindahl mechanism

  • D’ASPREMONT, Claude

    ()

    (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe

    ()

    (BETA, Université de Strasbourg, F-67085 Srasbourg, France)

We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both fully cooperative and non-cooperative cases as well as semi- cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector ÷ representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the public goods. In this model, the concept of "household ÷-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium for Nash-implementation and its extension to semi-cooperation. Existence is proved and some generic properties derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally, a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2012014.

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Date of creation: 05 Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2012014
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  1. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2010. "Non cooperative household demand," IFS Working Papers W10/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  2. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2010. "Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(545), pages 786-799, 06.
  3. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  5. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods," Economics Series Working Papers 226, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Vincenzo Platino, 2013. "Private versus public consumption within groups: testing the nature of goods from aggregate data," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/131703, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2011. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Non‐Cooperative Household Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1073-1096, 09.
  8. Nava Ashraf, 2009. "Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1245-77, September.
  9. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, . "Price-quantity competition with varying toughness," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2085, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
  11. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
  12. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October.
  13. Pahl, Jan, 2008. "Family finances, individualisation, spending patterns and access to credit," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 577-591, April.
  14. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-48, October.
  15. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  16. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  17. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
  18. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  19. Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 419-432, February.
  20. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
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