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Household behavior and individual autonomy

  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude

    ()

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe

The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2009022.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009022
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  1. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
  2. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
  3. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Competition for market share or for market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying competitive toughness," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1973, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2009. "Price-quantity competition with varying toughness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 62-82, January.
  5. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods," Economics Series Working Papers 226, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  7. Valerie Lechene & Martin Browning, 2004. "Collective and unitary models: a clarification," Economics Series Working Papers 191, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2010. "Non cooperative household demand," IFS Working Papers W10/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  9. Pahl, Jan, 2008. "Family finances, individualisation, spending patterns and access to credit," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 577-591, April.
  10. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  11. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2010. "Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(545), pages 786-799, 06.
  12. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  13. Zhiqi Chen & Frances Woolley, 1999. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Carleton Economic Papers 99-13, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2001.
  14. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
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