Optimal policy tradable and bankable pollution permits: taking the market microstructure into account
This paper analyses how the way emission permits are traded -their market microstructure-impacts the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets: market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting a ask price and a bid price. The possibility of permit banking is also introduced in our dynamic two-period model. We show that when the market makers and the agency do not know the technology of the producers with certainty, a positive spread may be set by market makers and that, under some conditions, banking increases the expected welfare given this market microstructure. If such a microstructure takes place or is organised on markets for pollution permits, we recommend to allow for banking (a) if the marginal willingness to pay for the environment increases much over time, (b) if the pollutant is rather a stock than a flow one, and/or (c) if the incomplete information faced by the intermediaries and by the agency is severe. In the first period, the environmental agency will then have to define and allocate a larger amount of permits than if banking is not allowed, but a lower or a same amount of permits in the second period.
|Date of creation:||00 Aug 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cronshaw, Mark B & Brown-Kruse, Jamie, 1996. "Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 179-89, March.
- Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
- Schennach, Susanne M., 2000. "The Economics of Pollution Permit Banking in the Context of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 189-210, November.
- Hahn, Robert W., 1982. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Working Papers 402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hagem, Cathrine & Westskog, Hege, 1998. "The Design of a Dynamic Tradeable Quota System under Market Imperfections," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 89-107, July.
- Kling, Catherine L. & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997.
"Bankable Permits for the Control of Environmental Pollution,"
Staff General Research Papers
1479, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
- Daniel Phaneuf & Till Requate, 2002. "Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(3), pages 369-390, July.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 1998. "Marketable pollution permits with uncertainty and transaction costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 27-50, March.
- Bruno Biais, 1990. "Formation des prix sur les marchés de contrepartie. Une synthèse de la littérature récente," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(5), pages 755-788.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.