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Análisis de la Política de Financiación Electoral en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Víctor Saavedra
  • Andrés Felipe Soto
  • Miguel Ángel Carvajal

Abstract

Este documento tiene como objetivo llevar a cabo un análisis retrospectivo de la política de financiación electoral en Colombia en los últimos anos. Dicho análisis se sintetizó en 11 hechos estilizados, donde se destacan aspectos como la influencia del acceso a crédito y la disposición de recursos propios en la financiación de campanas políticas, la concentración del gasto en propaganda electoral, la forma en la cual la configuración de las instituciones electorales permite y perpetúa la inequidad en el acceso a cargos de poder, la influencia de contextos sociales difíciles en el desarrollo de las actividades democráticas y la ausencia de capacidades que tienen las autoridades electorales para hacer cumplir las reglas. Además, considerando el diagnóstico realizado se identificaron como principios de una mejor política de financiación electoral: aumentar la financiación pública impulsando sobre todo la financiación de la propaganda electoral, el diseno de las instituciones electorales debe ser consecuente con el diseno de la política de financiación donde se debe promover la competencia paritaria entre y al interior de los partidos, se deben considerar las heterogeneidades regionales al establecer la política de financiación electoral y, por último, deben reforzarse las herramientas de inspección y vigilancia con las que cuentan las autoridades electorales. Sumado a esto, el documento hace comentarios al proyecto de reforma al Código Electoral a la luz de los principios identificados previamente, donde dicho proyecto de ley resulta compatible con algunos de ellos, pero aún dista de conseguir cambios estructurales necesarios para una mejor política de financiación electoral. Por último, se presenta un análisis de política comparada poniendo en perspectiva la política de financiación electoral de Colombia con la de algunos países referentes.****** Abstract: The purpose of this document is to carry out a retrospective analysis of the electoral financing policy in Colombia in recent years. This analysis was summarized in 11 stylized facts, highlighting aspects such as the influence of access to credit and the disposition of own resources in the financing of political campaigns, the concentration of spending on electoral propaganda, the way in which the configuration of electoral institutions allows and perpetuates inequity in the access to positions of power, the influence of difficult social contexts in the development of democratic activities and the absence of capacities of the electoral authorities to enforce the rules. In addition, considering the diagnosis made, the following principles were identified as principles for a better electoral financing policy: increase public financing, promoting above all the financing of electoral propaganda, the design of the electoral institutions must be consistent with the design of the financing policy where parity competition between and within the parties must be promoted, regional heterogeneities must be considered when establishing the electoral financing policy and, finally, the inspection and supervision tools available to the electoral authorities must be strengthened. In addition to this, the document comments on the Electoral Code reform project in the light of the principles previously identified, where said project is compatible with some of them, but it is still far from achieving the structural changes necessary for a better electoral financing policy. Finally, a comparative policy analysis is presented, putting in perspective the electoral financing policy of Colombia with that of some reference countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Víctor Saavedra & Andrés Felipe Soto & Miguel Ángel Carvajal, 2023. "Análisis de la Política de Financiación Electoral en Colombia," Informes de Investigación 20741, Fedesarrollo.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000124:020741
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11445/4411
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financiación Electoral; Propaganda Electoral; Gasto Electoral; Código Electoral; Competencia PolíticaDesigualdad; Instituciones Electorales; Consejo Nacional Electoral; Contratación PúblicaColombia; Electoral Financing; Electoral Propaganda; Electoral Expenditure; Electoral Code; Political Competition; Inequality; Electoral Institutions; National Electoral Council; Public Procurement; Colombia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H59 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Other
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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