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From strong leadership to active community engagement: effective resistance to illicit economies in Afro Colombian collective territories

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan D. Lobo
  • Maria Alejandra VÔøΩlez

Abstract

This paper studies the onset and recent expansion of illicit crops into the collective territories of rural Afro-Colombian communities in the Pacific region of Colombia. We analyze whether community organization and leadership can explain differences in the presence and expansion of coca crops in these territories. Following a mixed-method approach that combines the analysis of satellite imagery, semi-structured interviews and household surveys, our results suggest that community organization and leadership (as expressions of social capital) do explain differences in the expansion of illicit crops by enabling (or hindering) different forms of resistance. Investing in social capital is thus one way to reorient policy interventions, a goal to which the Colombian state can only partially contribute given its structural limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan D. Lobo & Maria Alejandra VÔøΩlez, 2020. "From strong leadership to active community engagement: effective resistance to illicit economies in Afro Colombian collective territories," Documentos CEDE 17908, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:017908
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. German Orbegozo, 2021. "Consequences of violence against social leaders in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 19320, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Rodriguez, Luz A. & Velez, María Alejandra & Pfaff, Alexander, 2021. "Leaders’ distributional & efficiency effects in collective responses to policy: Lab-in-field experiments with small-scale gold miners in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    3. Chávez, Carlos A. & Murphy, James J. & Quezada, Felipe J. & Stranlund, John K., 2023. "The endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 82-102.

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    JEL classification:

    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
    • Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
    • Q19 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Other
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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