Dinamic Maturity Transformation
We develop an infinite horizon equilibrium model in which banks finance long term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount of debt and its maturity taking into account investors’ preference for short maturities (which better accommodate their preference shocks) and the risk of systemic liquidity crises (during which refinancing is especially expensive). Unregulated debt maturities are inefficiently short due to pecuniary externalities in the market for funds during crises and their interaction with banks’ refinancing constraints. We show the possibility of improving welfare by means of limits to debt maturity, Pigovian taxes, and private and public liquidity insurance schemes.
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- Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011.
"Rollover Risk and Market Freezes,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 66(4), pages 1177-1209, 08.
- Acharya, Viral V & Gale, Douglas M & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2009. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," CEPR Discussion Papers 7122, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Acharya, Viral & Gale, Douglas & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2010. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," Working Papers 11-11, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," NBER Working Papers 15674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.