Using Collaborative Bargaining to Develop Environmental Policy when Information is Private
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References listed on IDEAS
- Rhoads, Thomas A & Shogren, Jason F, 2003. "Regulation through Collaboration: Final Authority and Information Symmetry in Environmental Coasean Bargaining," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 63-89, July.
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More about this item
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-03-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2011-03-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2011-03-19 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-03-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-03-19 (Game Theory)
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