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Regulation through Collaboration: Final Authority and Information Symmetry in Environmental Coasean Bargaining

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  • Rhoads, Thomas A
  • Shogren, Jason F

Abstract

Many people see collaborative decision-making as the next wave in environmental regulation. This paper examines how two elements within collaborative processes--final authority over stakeholder negotiations and information symmetry through mandated information sharing of relative payoffs--affect the efficiency and the distribution of wealth. Using a Coasean bargaining experiment, we find final authority for stakeholders is critical for efficient negotiations. Efficiency drops by two-thirds given a 10 percent risk to the final authority given symmetric information. Efficiency declines further once asymmetric information is considered. Final authority appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient agreements. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Rhoads, Thomas A & Shogren, Jason F, 2003. "Regulation through Collaboration: Final Authority and Information Symmetry in Environmental Coasean Bargaining," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 63-89, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:63-89
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Friesen, Lana & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Nguyen, Mai Phuong, 2023. "Initially contestable property rights and Coase: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    2. Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, "undated". "Using Collaborative Bargaining to Develop Environmental Policy when Information is Private," Working Papers 2011-07, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 11 Mar 2011.
    3. Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2010. "The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 157-182, February.
    4. Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2010. "The Effect of Entitlements and Equality on Cooperative Bargaining with Private, Unverifiable Information," Working Papers in Economics 10/68, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:68:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "WAEA Keynote Address Behavioral Environmental Economics: Money Pumps & Nudges," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1-12.
    7. repec:clg:wpaper:2008-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F., 2007. "Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 344-355, December.
    9. Michael J Weir & Catherine M Ashcraft & Natallia Leuchanka Diessner & Bridie McGreavy & Emily Vogler & Todd Guilfoos, 2020. "Language effects on bargaining," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, March.
    10. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    11. Warziniack, Travis & Shogren, Jason F. & Parkhurst, Gregory, 2007. "Creating contiguous forest habitat: An experimental examination on incentives and communication," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 191-207, August.
    12. Tyler Prante & Robert P. Berrens & Jennifer A. Thacher, 2007. "Evaluating coasean bargaining experiments with meta-analysis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(68), pages 1-7.

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