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Public versus Secret Voting in Committees: Appendix

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  • Andrea Mattozzi
  • M. Nakaguma

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  • Andrea Mattozzi & M. Nakaguma, 2017. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees: Appendix," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001668, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001668
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/general/sociology/mattozzi-papers/committees_appendix.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020. "Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 246-276, August.

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