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The effect of increased transparency on an individualistic monetary policy committee

Author

Listed:
  • Apel, Mikael

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Blix Grimaldi, Marianna

    (Financial Stability Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Ahrenberg, Lars

    (Linköping University)

  • Jönsson, Arne

    (Linköping University)

Abstract

Most empirical research on the effects of transparency on monetary policy committees is based on a natural experiment in 1993 at the Federal Reserve, when it was decided that transcripts of meetings would be released with a five-year lag. Evidence is found of both a conformity effect (reluctance to offer dissenting opinions) and a discipline effect (more thorough preparation). We investigate the effects of increased transparency on a monetary policy committee using another and arguably more timely natural experiment. In May 2007, the Swedish central bank started to include the names of Executive Board members in the minutes of monetary policy meetings. We find that members began to put more effort into explaining their views (a form of discipline effect), that interaction between members decreased, and that references to members’ own previous views became more common. A key insight is that the effects of increased transparency depend on the nature of the change and the type of committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Apel, Mikael & Blix Grimaldi, Marianna & Ahrenberg, Lars & Jönsson, Arne, 2026. "The effect of increased transparency on an individualistic monetary policy committee," Working Paper Series 463, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0463
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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