Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989.
"Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 25-52, Spring.
- Besanko, D. & Spulber, D.F., 1988. "Delegated Law Enforcement And Noncooperative Behavior," Papers m8820, Southern California - Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996.
"Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions,"
Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(2), pages 149-165.
- Robin W. Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Working Paper 883, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- BOADWAY, Robin & MARCEAU, Nicolas & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1996. "Time-consistent criminal sanctions," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1337, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- BOADWAY, Robin & MARCEAU, Nicolas & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1994. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Papers 9318, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
- Picard, Pierre, 1996.
"Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
- Picard, Pierre, 1994. "Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud : the credibility issue," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9420, CEPREMAP.
- Black, Dan A & Nagin, Daniel S, 1998. "Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 209-219, January.
- Dezhbakhsh, Hashem & Rubin, Paul H, 1998. "Lives Saved or Lives Lost? The Effects of Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 468-474, May.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
- Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
Most related itemsThese are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
- Rubin, Paul H. & Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, 2003. "The effect of concealed handgun laws on crime: beyond the dummy variables," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 199-216, June.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
- Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
- Boyer, M. Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2003. "Merging automobile regulatory bodies: The case of Atlantic Canada," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Dionne, Georges, 1998.
"La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
- Dionne, G., 1998. "La mesure empirique des problemes d'information," Papers 9833, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- G. Dionne, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d'information," THEMA Working Papers 98-33, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2003. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(Supplemen), pages 193-211, September.
- Philip A. Curry & Anindya Sen & George Orlov, 2016.
"Crime, apprehension and clearance rates: Panel data evidence from Canadian provinces,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(2), pages 481-514, May.
- Philip A. Curry & Anindya Sen & George Orlov, 2016. "Crime, apprehension and clearance rates: Panel data evidence from Canadian provinces," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 481-514, May.
- Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, 2013.
"Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence?:Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine,"
Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(3), pages 821-854.
- Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, 2012. "Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Castle Doctrine," NBER Working Papers 18134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2009.
"Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 58-70, January.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026, HAL.
- Dionne, Georges & Giuliano, Florence & Picard, Pierre, 2009. "Optimal auditing with scoring: theory and application to insurance fraud," MPRA Paper 18374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
- M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
- M. Martin Boyer & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2001. "Inflation as a Strategic Response," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-26, CIRANO.
- Barati, Mehdi, 2016. "New evidence on the impact of concealed carry weapon laws on crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 76-83.
- Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, 2010. "The Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment," NBER Chapters, in: Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, pages 43-94, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6456 is not listed on IDEAS
- M. Boyer & Patrick González, 2004.
"Optimal audit policies with correlated types,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 325-334, August.
- M. Martin Boyer & Patrick Gonzalez, 2000. "Optimal Audit Policies with Correlated Types," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1514, Econometric Society.
- Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
More about this item
KeywordsCrime and Crime prevention; Non-commitment; Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Criminalité et prévention; Absence d'engagement; Aléa moral; Anti-sélection;
All these keywords.
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciranca.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.