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Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

  • Claudia Keser
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    Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation to the next. The majority of the strategies submitted for the final simulation show the same pattern: In the first period, they signal their willingness to cooperate by contributing the entire endowment to the public good. Then, they reciprocate the others' average contribution in the previous period. In the final period(s), cooperation is given up, whatever the history of the game. Les participants à une expérience ont soumis des stratégies pour jouer à un jeu de biens publics. Les stratégies ont interagi dans une simulation par ordinateur. Les participants ont eu l'opportunité de réviser et de re-soumettre leurs stratégies pour une deuxième et une troisième simulation. La contribution moyenne des stratégies au bien public a augmenté d'une simulation à l'autre. La majorité des stratégies soumises montrent le même patron de comportement. Dans la première période le participant signale sa volonté à coopérer par une contribution totale au bien public. Puis il s'aligne sur la contribution moyenne faite par les autres dans la période précédente. Dans la (les) période(s) finale(s), la coopération est abandonnée indépendamment du développement du jeu.

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    File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-35.pdf
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    Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2000s-35.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2000
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-35
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    1. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
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    22. repec:dgr:uvatin:20000011 is not listed on IDEAS
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