IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cgd/wpaper/306.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?

Author

Listed:
  • Pedro L. Rodríguez, José R. Morales, Fancisco J. Monaldi

Abstract

Venezuela is a textbook example of a resource-dependent country—between 1950 and 2008, oil generated over a trillion dollars of income for the state. Nevertheless, Venezuela currently combines an economy that is stagnant, despite high oil prices, with an increasingly authoritarian government. The authors argue that large oil rents that accrue to the state, together with a lack of formal and transparent mechanisms to facilitate citizen oversight, are a large part of the problem. They consider the nature of the fiscal contract between the Venezuelan government and its people. This has been characterized by increasing discretion of the executive; only a small share of the rents is now subject to political oversight within the framework of the budgetary system. The authors consider the case for direct distribution of rents, distinguishing it from a populist approach to transfers as effected through Venezuela’s misiones. They also report on focus group discussions of the direct- distribution approach and the political viability of direct transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro L. Rodríguez, José R. Morales, Fancisco J. Monaldi, 2012. "Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?," Working Papers 306, Center for Global Development.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:306
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426486_file_Rodriguez_et_al_Venezuela_OTC_FINAL.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Benno Torgler, 2005. "Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad & Mick Moore, 2007. "Taxation and State Building: Poor Countries in a Globalised World," CMI Working Papers 11, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    3. Moore, Mick, 2007. "How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?," Working Papers 12795, Institute of Development Studies, International Centre for Tax and Development.
    4. Emmanuel Skoufias & Vincenzo Di Maro, 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Adult Work Incentives, and Poverty," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(7), pages 935-960.
    5. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad, 2007. "Reaching out: Access to and use of banking services across countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 234-266, July.
    6. Christian Daude & Ángel Melguizo, 2010. "Taxation and More Representation?: On Fiscal Policy, Social Mobility and Democracy in Latin America," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 294, OECD Publishing.
    7. Yanez-Pagans, Monica, 2008. "Culture and Human Capital Investments: Evidence of an Unconditional Cash Transfer Program in Bolivia," IZA Discussion Papers 3678, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Skoufias, Emmanuel & Parker, Susan W., 2001. "Conditional cash transfers and their impact on child work and schooling," FCND briefs 123, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    9. Eoin McGuirk, 2013. "The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 285-313, March.
    10. Sandbu, Martin E., 2006. "Natural wealth accounts: A proposal for alleviating the natural resource curse," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1153-1170, July.
    11. Corden, W Max & Neary, J Peter, 1982. "Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 825-848, December.
    12. Ross, Michael L., 2004. "Does Taxation Lead to Representation?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(02), pages 229-249, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    oil; natural resources; accountability; transfers; Venezuela; governance;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publications Manager). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cgdevus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.