Cake Division by Majority Decision
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References listed on IDEAS
- Roth, Alvin E, 1985. "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 207-211, January.
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- Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 371-376, April.
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More about this item
Keywordsdivision of a cake; majority decisions; tie-breaking rules;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-01-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2007-01-02 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2007-01-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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