Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms
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More about this item
Keywordshold-up problems; environmental regulation; taxes and subsidies; self-financing mechanisms; emission control;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2005-09-29 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2005-09-29 (Resource Economics)
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