Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsHold-up problems; Environmental regulation; Taxes and subsidies; Selffinancing mechanisms; Emission control;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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