Government Incentives When Pollution Permits Are Durable Goods
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- Haucap, Justus & Kirstein, Roland, 2001. "Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
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Cited by:
- Rajeev K. Goel & Edward W. T. Hsieh, 2004. "Durable Emissions and Optimal Pigouvian Taxes," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(4), pages 441-449, July.
- Haucap, Justus & Kirstein, Roland, 2002. "Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Eva Schliephake, 2013. "Risk Weighted Capital Regulation and Government Debt," FEMM Working Papers 130011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Schneider, Friedrich, 2003.
"On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 369-396, June.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner & Friedrich Schneider, 2002. "On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 741, CESifo.
- Halkos, George, 2009. "A Differential game approach in the case of a polluting oligopoly," MPRA Paper 23742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leon Vinokur, 2009. "Environmental Policy under Ambiguity," Working Papers 638, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Leon Vinokur, 2009. "Environmental Policy under Ambiguity," Working Papers 638, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Rajeev Goel, 2006. "Uncertain innovation with uncertain product durability," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(13), pages 829-834.
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JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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