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Investment without Regulatory Commitment: The Case of Elastic Demand

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  • Urbiztondo, Santiago

Abstract

This paper analyzes a regulation game with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. It expands Besanko and Spulber's (1989) framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand case, i.e., incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to Besanko and Spulber's result. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Urbiztondo, Santiago, 1994. "Investment without Regulatory Commitment: The Case of Elastic Demand," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 87-96, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:87-96
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    Cited by:

    1. Breitscheidel, Jörg, 2005. "Self-financing Tax/Subsidy Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation with Many Firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-87, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Tahvanainen, Kaisa & Honkapuro, Samuli & Partanen, Jarmo & Viljainen, Satu, 2012. "Experiences of modern rate of return regulation in Finland," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 32-39.
    3. Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March.
    5. Breitscheidel, Jörg, 2005. "Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Joerg Breitscheidel & Hans Gersbach, 2005. "Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1528, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.

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