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Competition Between Green and Blue Hydrogen and Indirect Network Effects

Author

Listed:
  • Kine Josefine Aurland-Bredesen
  • Rolf Golombek
  • Mads Greaker

Abstract

Whereas hydrogen is currently a marginal energy carrier, the aim of the EU is to trigger low-carbon hydrogen production that covers around 10 percent of EU’s energy needs by 2050. If this comes true, it will be an energy revolution. We study competition between green and blue hydrogen by proposing a Salop model that encompasses the value chains for hydrogen and CCS. For blue hydrogen, we distinguish between central production—natural gas is transformed to hydrogen close to the extraction site and hydrogen is then transported over a long distance via terminals to the hydrogen consumers—and local production—natural gas is transformed to hydrogen at terminals located near the hydrogen consumers. We find that mark-ups are highest under central blue hydrogen production, which implies that total production of hydrogen, supply of blue hydrogen, and share of plants investing in carbon capture facilities are lower under central production than under local production of blue hydrogen. We provide numerical simulations of the alternative market outcomes and also the corresponding social outcomes, and calculate the magnitude of policy instruments that should be used in order to obtain the social outcomes under central and local blue hydrogen production.

Suggested Citation

  • Kine Josefine Aurland-Bredesen & Rolf Golombek & Mads Greaker, 2025. "Competition Between Green and Blue Hydrogen and Indirect Network Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series 12130, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    2. Rolf Golombek & Mads Greaker & Snorre Kverndokk & Lin Ma, 2023. "Policies to Promote Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(1), pages 267-302, May.
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    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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