Does Anticipated Regret Really Matter? Revisiting the Role of Feedback in Auction Bidding
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Katuščák, Peter & Michelucci, Fabio & Zajíček, Miroslav, 2015. "Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 139-152.
More about this item
Keywordsauctions; bidding; feedback; regret;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2013-12-20 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-12-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-12-20 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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