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Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within the Common Economic Area: the Case of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia

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  • Ainura Uzagalieva

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the possible impact of planned monetary integration on public sector revenues from seigniorage in three countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the central bank revenues in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of seigniorage revenues in financing public sector expenditures. Amounts of yearly transfers from central banks to the state budget in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are evaluated, and the size of potential gains and looses in seigniorage revenues under different scenarios of monetary integration are estimated.

Suggested Citation

  • Ainura Uzagalieva, 2005. "Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within the Common Economic Area: the Case of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp254, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp254
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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