IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information

  • Rodolfo Apreda

In this paper we oversee the logic of information sets, firstly handling information and markets in perfect environments and, secondly, dealing with information and markets in imperfect environments, in the context of bounded rationality. Further on, asymmetric information is addressed together with the role of opportunistic behaviour through hidden action, hidden information, the free-rider problem and signaling, expanding on financial accounting and asymmetric information. At last, asymmetric markets are expanded on, reviewing the buyers’ and sellers’ markets so as to handle the performance of intermediaries who stand ready to provide with immediacy and liquidity to buyers and sellers of financial assets. There are two contributions that this paper brings forward: firstly, an intuitive treatment of information sets in the context of mathematical Set Theory so as to make tractable some issues still neglected. Secondly, we claim and develop that a careful assessment of information sets makes headway towards an approach that regards market makers and other intermediaries as brokers of asymmetric information.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/190.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 190.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:190
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Av. Córdoba 374, (C1054AAP) Capital Federal

Phone: (5411) 6314-3000
Fax: (5411) 4314-1654
Web page: http://www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/doc_trabajo.html
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  2. Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, 1991. "Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure and Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 3862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Grossman, S.J. & Miller, M.H., 1988. "Liquidity And Market Structure," Papers 88, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
  4. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
  5. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-152, Summer.
  6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
  7. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
  8. Rodolfo Apreda, 2000. "Differential Rates of Return and Residual Information Sets (A Discrete Approach)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 177, Universidad del CEMA.
  9. Rodolfo Apreda, 2000. "A transaction costs approach to financial assets rates of return," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 161, Universidad del CEMA.
  10. Flood, Mark D. & Huisman, Ronald & Koedijk, Kees G. & Lyons, Richard K., 2012. "Search Costs: The Neglected Spread Component," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series qt5q05g9pt, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  11. Spulber,Daniel F., 1999. "Market Microstructure," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521659789, Junio.
  12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
  13. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
  15. Thomas Ho & Hans Stoll, . "Optimal Dealer Pricing Under Transactions and Return Uncertainty," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 27-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  16. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2002. "Theory of Incomplete Markets, Volume 1," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262632543, March.
  17. Rodolfo Apreda, 1998. "Dynamic Arbitrage Gaps for Financial Assets," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 134, Universidad del CEMA.
  18. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
  19. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, December.
  20. Copeland, Thomas E & Galai, Dan, 1983. " Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1457-69, December.
  21. Scitovsky, Tibor, 1990. "The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 135-48, Winter.
  22. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1974. "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-10, March.
  23. Coase, R H, 1977. "The Wealth of Nations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(3), pages 309-25, July.
  24. Garman, Mark B., 1976. "Market microstructure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 257-275, June.
  25. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Making by Price-Setting Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 559-580.
  26. George J. Stigler, 1957. "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 1.
  27. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.
  28. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  29. Mark S. Carey & Stephen D. Prowse & John Rea & Gregory F. Udell, 1993. "The economics of the private placement market," Staff Studies 166, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valeria Dowding)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.