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Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

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  • Singh, Nirvikar

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  • Singh, Nirvikar, 2017. "Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt47s2036r, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt47s2036r
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    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    3. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    4. World Bank, 2004. "India : Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments," World Bank Publications - Reports 14674, The World Bank Group.
    5. Khemani, Stuti, 2001. "Decentralization and accountability : are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2557, The World Bank.
    6. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    7. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo & Michael McFaul & Barry R. Weingast, 2007. "Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 160-189, Spring.
    8. Friedman, David, 1977. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 59-77, February.
    9. Khemani, Stuti, 2004. "Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-154, February.
    10. Pradeep Chhibber, 1995. "Political parties, electoral competition, government expenditures and economic reform in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(1), pages 74-96.
    11. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    12. repec:cdl:ucscec:qt11b543tk is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Basu, Kaushik, 2003. "Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199261857.
    14. Hope,Nicholas C. & Kochar,Anjini & Noll,Roger & Srinivasan,T. N. (ed.), 2013. "Economic Reform in India," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107020047, November.
    15. Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India," MPRA Paper 1447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Miss Catriona Purfield, 2004. "The Decentralization Dilemma in India," IMF Working Papers 2004/032, International Monetary Fund.
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