Holding India together: The role of institutions of federalism
India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. It stands out in having held together while sustaining a working democracy for over five decades, at relatively low levels of income. One of the main institutional aspects of managing heterogeneity to preserve national unity is the structures of Indian federalism. This paper traces some of the features of Indian federal institutions, focusing on their contribution to this ‘holding together.’ It reviews the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the role of federal structures in sustaining unity, and summarizes historical developments and current institutional structures of the Indian case. It assesses the role of federal dimensions of political, administrative and judicial structures in the holding together function. It also examines fiscal federal institutions and their impacts, including distributional and growth issues. It also separately focuses specifically on the special treatment of what may be characterized as India’s periphery.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997.
"On the Number and Size of Nations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
- Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard, 1997.
"The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-90, November.
- Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gérard, 1995. "The Break up of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2004. "Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-154, February.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India," MPRA Paper 1447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2007. "Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 464-484, March.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2001. "Decentralization and accountability : are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2557, The World Bank.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2003.
"Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9jk1j8m1, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2003. "Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt94r0j02t, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2003. "Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt94r0j02t, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Nirvikar Singh & Laveesh Bhandari & Aoyu Chen & Aarti Khare, 2004. "Regional Inequality in India: A Fresh Look," Development and Comp Systems 0412006, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12432. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.