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Crime, elections, and political competition

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  • Shabana Mitra
  • Althaf Shajahan

Abstract

Are elections immediately preceded by periods of increased violent crimes? In this paper, we test the link between criminal activity and electoral cycles. We use annual data from 1981 to 2007 on crimes and data from the parliamentary elections in India for the same period. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find that election years have significantly higher incidence of violent crimes even after accounting for poverty and inequality. This effect is statistically significant and consistent across specifications. The effect is magnified in districts that are more competitive. Similar regressions using economic crimes and elections show either a decline or no effect. Our results are strongly indicative of a close link between violent crimes and elections, and are critical for the growing debate on the criminalization of politics in developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Shabana Mitra & Althaf Shajahan, 2022. "Crime, elections, and political competition," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 2394-2413, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:26:y:2022:i:4:p:2394-2413
    DOI: 10.1111/rode.12916
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Ambika & Mukherjee, Anirban, 2023. "Electoral Cycles and Caste Violence in India," SocArXiv bh2vk, Center for Open Science.

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