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Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia

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  • Rui J. P. de Figueiredo
  • Michael McFaul
  • Barry R. Weingast

Abstract

All federal systems face the two fundamental dilemmas of federalism: too strong a center risks overawing the subnational units; and too weak a center risks free-riding that makes the system fall apart. Resolving the two dilemmas is problematic because mitigating one dilemma exacerbates the other. We develop a model of federal institutions that shows the circumstances under which both dilemmas can be solved so that federal institutions are self-enforcing. We apply our approach to modern Russia where we suggest that when the center is too strong, its ability to extract rents increases and the benefits for maintaining participation in the federal bargain disappears. We also suggest strong parallels between Russia and those of the early United States under the Articles of Confederation. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rui J. P. de Figueiredo & Michael McFaul & Barry R. Weingast, 2007. "Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 160-189, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:37:y:2007:i:2:p:160-189
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjm002
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    Cited by:

    1. Mitchell, Austin M. & Yin, Weiwen, 2022. "Political centralization, career incentives, and local economic growth in Edo Japan," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    3. Leeson, Peter T. & Suarez, Paola A., 2016. "An economic analysis of Magna Carta," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(S), pages 40-46.
    4. Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "Holding India together: The role of institutions of federalism," MPRA Paper 12432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Rachit Srivastava, 2023. "Federalism in Russia After 1991," International Studies, , vol. 60(2), pages 197-208, April.
    6. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.

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