Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives
This paper contrasts 'economic' and 'organizational' approaches to corporate governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. Some promising areas of new research are identified which examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, it is argued that they call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the governance of the corporation. The paper concludes by advocating a re-consideration and broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and understanding how companies are governed.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lazonick, William & O'Sullivan, Mary, 1996. "Organization, Finance and International Competition," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-49.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives, And Agency Theory," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 7(2), pages 40-45.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Varian, H.R., 1989. "Monitoring Agents With Other Agents," Papers 89-18, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, June.
- Learmount, Simon, 2002. "Corporate Governance: What Can Be Learned From Japan?," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199252916, March.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 351-66, September.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Melinda Muth & Lex Donaldson, 1998. "Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: a contingency approach," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, 01.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, .
"Power in a Theory of the Firm,"
CRSP working papers
335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- O'Sullivan, Mary, 2000. "The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 393-416, July.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971.
"Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-86, April.
- Keith J. Blois, 1999. "Trust in Business to Business Relationships: An Evaluation of its Status," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 197-215, 03.
- Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp237. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.