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Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives

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  • Simon Learmount

Abstract

This paper contrasts 'economic' and 'organizational' approaches to corporate governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. Some promising areas of new research are identified which examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, it is argued that they call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the governance of the corporation. The paper concludes by advocating a re-consideration and broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and understanding how companies are governed.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Learmount, 2002. "Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives," Working Papers wp237, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp237
    Note: PRO-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Clarke, 2005. "Accounting for Enron: shareholder value and stakeholder interests," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(5), pages 598-612, September.
    2. Lippert, Inge, 2008. "Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ans├Ątze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work SP III 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Governance; Social Controls;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General

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