Diagnosing and Mitigating Market Power in Chile’s Electricity Industry
This paper examines generators’ incentives to exercise market power and the strategies they would follow if all electricity supplies were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modelled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of generators’ strategic behaviour indicate that the largest (Endesa) would have the incentive and power to act unilaterally. It would schedule its hydro resources to take advantage of differences in price electricity: too little supply in high demand periods and too much in low demand periods. Two market power mitigation measures are analysed: requiring Endesa to divest some of its generating capacity, and fixed price forward contracts for dominant generators. Conditions for the development of a voluntary contract market are analysed, as it is not practical to rely permanently on vesting contracts imposed for the transition period.
|Date of creation:||May 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donatos, George S. & Mergos, George J., 1991. "Residential demand for electricity: The case of Greece," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 41-47, January.
- Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999.
"Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures,"
The Energy Journal,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
- Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James & Knittel, Chris, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," Staff General Research Papers 31548, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.