IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Large Elections


  • Carl Heese
  • Stephan Lauermann


This paper studies the Bayes correlated equilibria of large majority elections in a general environment with heterogeneous, private preferences. Voters have exogeneous private signals and a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds when voters do not receive additional information (Feddersen & Pesendorfer, 1997). We show that any state-contingent outcome can be implemented in some Bayes-Nash equilibrium by an expansion of the exogenous private signal structure. We interpret the result in terms of the possibility of persuasion by a biased sender who provides additional information to voters who also have noisy private information from other sources. The additional information can be an almost public signal that almost reveals the state truthfully. The same additional information is shown to be effective uniformly across environments so that persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the distribution of the voters' private information and preferences. In a numerical example with uniform voter types, we show the effects of persuasion with already 17 or more voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2019. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Large Elections," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_128, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_128

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Voting; Information Aggregation; Persuasion; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CRC Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.