Coordinating Static and Dynamic Supply Chains with Advertising through Two-Part Tariffs
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More about this item
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-04-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2013-04-13 (Marketing)
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