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Robustifying optimal monetary policy using simple rules as cross-checks

Author

Listed:
  • Pelin Ilbas

    (National Bank of Belgium)

  • Øistein Røisland

    () (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))

  • Tommy Sveen

    (BI Norwegian Business School)

Abstract

There are two main approaches to modelling monetary policy; simple instrument rules and optimal policy. We propose an alternative that combines the two by extending the loss function with a term penalizing deviations from a simple rule. We analyze the properties of the modified loss function by considering three different models for the US economy. The choice of the weight on the simple rule determines the trade-off between optimality and robustness. We show that by placing some weight on a simple Taylor-type rule in the loss function, one can prevent disastrous outcomes if the model is not a correct representation of the underlying economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Pelin Ilbas & Øistein Røisland & Tommy Sveen, 2012. "Robustifying optimal monetary policy using simple rules as cross-checks," Working Paper 2012/22, Norges Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2012_22
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    File URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Published/Papers/Working-Papers/2012/WP-201222/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2012. "Surprising Comparative Properties of Monetary Models: Results from a New Model Database," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 800-816, August.
    2. Taylor, John B. & Williams, John C., 2010. "Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 15, pages 829-859 Elsevier.
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2010. "Inflation Targeting," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1237-1302 Elsevier.
    4. Tillmann, Peter, 2012. "Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 204-207.
    5. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bursian, Dirk & Roth, Markus, 2013. "Optimal policy and taylor rule cross-checking under parameter uncertainty," SAFE Working Paper Series 30, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    2. Pelin Ilbas & Øistein Røisland & Tommy Sveen, 2013. "The influence of the Taylor rule on US monetary policy," Working Paper 2013/04, Norges Bank.
    3. Carl Walsh, 2015. "Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 5293, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Winkelried, Diego, 2013. "Modelo de Proyección Trimestral del BCRP: Actualización y novedades," Revista Estudios Económicos, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, issue 26, pages 9-60.
    5. Carl E. Walsh, 2015. "Day Two Keynote Address: Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 295-352, September.
    6. David H. Papell & Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy & Ruxandra Prodan, 2016. "Policy Rule Legislation in Practice," Book Chapters, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    7. Carl E. Walshn, 2016. "Goals versus Rules as Central Bank Preformance Measures," Book Chapters, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Model uncertainty; optimal control; simple rules;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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