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Goals versus Rules as Central Bank Preformance Measures

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  • Carl E. Walshn

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  • Carl E. Walshn, 2016. "Goals versus Rules as Central Bank Preformance Measures," Book Chapters, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hoo:bookch:11-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    2. Levin, Andrew T. & Williams, John C., 2003. "Robust monetary policy with competing reference models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 945-975, July.
    3. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    5. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 69-90, Fall.
    6. Charles T Carlstrom & Timothy S Fuerst, 2009. "Central Bank Independence And Inflation: A Note," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(1), pages 182-186, January.
    7. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2014. "Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 189-259, March.
    8. Pier Francesco Asso & George A. Kahn & Robert Leeson, 2010. "The Taylor rule and the practice of central banking," Research Working Paper RWP 10-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    9. Erceg, Christopher J. & Henderson, Dale W. & Levin, Andrew T., 2000. "Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 281-313, October.
    10. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    11. Miguel Casares & Antonio Moreno & Jesús Vázquez, 2012. "Wage stickiness and unemployment fluctuations: an alternative approach," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 395-422, September.
    12. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981.
    14. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    15. Tillmann, Peter, 2012. "Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 204-207.
    16. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2002. "Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(2), pages 63-146.
    17. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Rudebusch, Glenn D., 2002. "Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1161-1187, September.
    19. Francisco Ruge-Murcia, 2014. "Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 301-326, June.
    20. Pelin Ilbas & Øistein Røisland & Tommy Sveen, 2012. "Robustifying optimal monetary policy using simple rules as cross-checks," Working Paper 2012/22, Norges Bank.
    21. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    22. Billi, Roberto M., 2013. "Nominal GDP Targeting and the Zero Lower Bound: Should We Abandon Inflation Targeting?," Working Paper Series 270, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    23. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    24. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    25. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    26. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216.
    27. Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
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