Bank regulation and bank crisis
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References listed on IDEAS
- Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Working Papers 7582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
KeywordsBanking crises; history of bank regulation; capital adequacy; Basel I & II;
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2009-11-07 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2009-11-07 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2009-11-07 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-REG-2009-11-07 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2009-11-07 (Risk Management)
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