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The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form - Part I - Symmetries

Listed author(s):
  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Peter Sudhölter
  • Joachim Rosenmüller

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Within this series of papers we plan to exhibit to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' representation in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the game. The operation defined this way will respect the restriction of games to subgames and yield a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover, by the above requirements the 'canonical extensive game form' will be uniquely defined. Part I is dealing with isomorphisms of game forms and games. An automorphism of the game is called motion. A symmetry of a game is a permutation which can be augmented to a motion. Some results on the existence of symmetry groups are presented. The context to the notion of symmetry for coalitional games is exhibited.

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File Function: First version, 1996
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Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 253.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Apr 1996
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:253
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