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The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries

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  • Peleg, Bezalel

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Rosenmüller, Joachim

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Sudhölter, Peter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017. "The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 253, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:253
    as

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2911249/2911250
    File Function: First Version, 1996
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel, 1997. "A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-308, September.

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