The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries
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- Peleg, Bezalel, 1997. "A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-308, September.
- Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000.
"The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
- Sudhölter, Peter & Rosenmüller, Joachim, 2017. "The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 257, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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