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A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case

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  • Peleg, Bezalel

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  • Peleg, Bezalel, 1997. "A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-308, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:3:p:305-308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017. "The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 253, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    4. Peleg, B., 1996. "A Formal Approach to Nash´s Program," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1996,8, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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