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The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation

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  • Sudholter, Peter
  • Rosenmuller, Joachim
  • Peleg, Bezalel

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  • Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:299-338
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    3. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    4. Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017. "The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 253, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cao, Zhigang & Yang, Xiaoguang, 2018. "Symmetric games revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 9-18.
    2. Casajus, Andre, 2003. "Weak isomorphism of extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 267-290, December.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1997. "A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-308, September.
    4. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    5. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.

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