On Sustainable Equilibria
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DOI: 10.1145/3391403.3399514
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Other versions of this item:
- Govindan, Srihari & Laraki, Rida & Pahl, Lucas, 2023. "On sustainable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Srihari Govindan & Rida Laraki & Lucas Pahl, 2020. "On Sustainable Equilibria," Papers 2005.14094, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
- Srihari Govindan & Rida Laraki & Lucas Pahl, 2020. "On Sustainable Equilibria," Post-Print hal-03084834, HAL.
- Srihari Govindan & Rida Laraki & Lucas Pahl, 2023. "On sustainable equilibria," Post-Print hal-04305157, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868.
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- Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003.
"From evolutionary to strategic stability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
- DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Andrew McLennan, 2018. "Advanced Fixed Point Theory for Economics," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-981-13-0710-2, September.
- P. Herings & Ronald Peeters, 2010.
"Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 119-156, January.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2006. "Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory," Research Memorandum 046, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Ritzberger, Klaus, 1994. "The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(3), pages 207-236.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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