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Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

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Listed:
  • Oriol Tejada
  • Carles Rafels

Abstract

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and show that they are marginal worth vectors, although this does not hold for arbitrary multi-sided assignment games. Finally we show that prices that are obtained from core allocations are competitive and vice versa.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriol Tejada & Carles Rafels, 2015. "Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets," Working Papers 370, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:370
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Pere Villar, Joan, 2002. "Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 231-239, February.
    2. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882.
    3. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 331-346, August.
    4. Stuart, Harborne Jr, 1997. "The supplier-firm-buyer game and its m-sided generalization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 21-27, August.
    5. Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 544, The University of Melbourne.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oriol Tejada, 2009. "Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets," Working Papers in Economics 229, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    2. Oriol Tejada & Carles Rafels, 2010. "Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 249-258, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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