Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as a threat- in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.
|Date of creation:||2009|
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- Theo S. H. Driessen, 1998. "A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 301-303.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1982.
"Cores of partitioning games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 313-327, December.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Cores of Partitioning Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Quint, Thomas, 1991. "The core of an m-sided assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 487-503, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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