A Canonical Representation for the Assignment Game: the Kernel and the Nucleolus
The core of an assignment market is the translation, by the vector of minimum core payoffs, of the core of another better positioned market, the matrix of which has the properties of being dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal. This new matrix is defined as the canonical form of the original assignment situation, and it is uniquely characterized by these three properties. The behavior of some well-known cooperative solutions in relation with the canonical form is analyzed. The kernel and the nucleolus of the assignment game, are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of the canonical representative by the vector of minimal core payoffs.
|Date of creation:||May 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +34 93 542-1222
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Web page: http://www.barcelonagse.eu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- T. E. S. Raghavan & Tamás Solymosi, 2001. "Assignment games with stable core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 177-185.
- Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, Tirukkannamangai E S, 1994. "An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 119-43.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:279. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.