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Uniform-price assignment markets

Author

Listed:
  • Marina Nunez Oliva
  • Carlos Rafels Pallarola

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

Uniform{price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar- kets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the BAohm{Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2005. "Uniform-price assignment markets," Working Papers in Economics 135, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005135
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marina Núñez, 2004. "A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 55-65, January.
    2. Daniel Granot & Frieda Granot, 1992. "On Some Network Flow Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 792-841, November.
    3. Quint, Thomas, 1991. "Characterization of Cores of Assignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(4), pages 413-420.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541, Elsevier.
    5. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Theo S. H. Driessen, 1998. "A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 301-303.
    7. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-479, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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