Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
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Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
- Theo S. H. Driessen, 1998. "A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 301-303.
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