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The core matchings of markets with transfers

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  • Chambers, Christopher P.
  • Echenique, Federico

Abstract

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching ? in the set for which ?(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. (JEL C78)
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Suggested Citation

  • Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, 2008. "The core matchings of markets with transfers," Working Papers 1298, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1298
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1298.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    2. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, January.
    3. Federico Echenique, 2008. "What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 757-768, August.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Jun Wako, 2006. "Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 213-217, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Agatsuma, Yasushi, 2016. "Testable implications of the core in TU market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 23-29.
    2. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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