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Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

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  • Oriol Tejada

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found sufficient conditions, that always hold for bilateral markets, that guarantee substitutability and a extended notion of complementarity among agents in arbitrary multilateral assignment markets. I also prove that Shapleys (1962) result always holds regardless the number of sectors of the market when goods in the market are homogeneous.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriol Tejada, 2009. "Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets," Working Papers in Economics 229, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2009229
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 544, The University of Melbourne.
    2. Oriol Tejada & Carles Rafels, 2009. "Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets," Working Papers 370, Barcelona School of Economics.
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    3. Oriol Tejada & Carles Rafels, 2010. "Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 249-258, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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