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Loans, Insurance and Failures in the Credit Market for Students

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  • Elena Del Rey
  • Bertrand Verheyden

Abstract

Whereas public student loans are often income contingent, private banks typically offer pure loans, or don't offer loans at all. In order to provide a rationale for these observations, we present a model with perfectly competitive banks and risk averse students who have private information on their ability to learn. We show that the combination of ex-post moral hazard and adverse selection produces credit market rationing when default penalties are low. Intermediate levels of default penalties can result in the existence of an equilibrium that pools together ability types. However, pooling contracts are not insuring at equilibrium, which implies a second type of credit market failure. Finally, if default penalties are large enough, equilibrium contracts provide less able students with insurance against the eventuality of a bad outcome, just in the income contingent loan fashion. The model is also used to explain other stylized facts, such as the positive impact of returns to education and interest rate subsidies on the development of the student loan market. Also, it explains why, unlike banks, governments oer income contingent loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Del Rey & Bertrand Verheyden, 2008. "Loans, Insurance and Failures in the Credit Market for Students," Working Papers 359, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bas Jacobs & Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen, 2007. "Capital-Market Failure, Adverse Selection, and Equity Financing of Higher Education," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(1), pages 1-32, March.
    2. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    3. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2004. "Financing New Investments under Asymmetric Information: a General Approach," Cahiers de recherche 0407, CIRPEE.
    4. John Fender & Ping Wang, 2003. "Educational Policy in a Credit Constrained Economy with Skill Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 939-964, August.
    5. Lance J. Lochner & Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2011. "The Nature of Credit Constraints and Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2487-2529, October.
    6. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    7. Bruce Chapman & David Greenaway, 2006. "Learning to Live with Loans? International Policy Transfer and the Funding of Higher Education," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1057-1075, August.
    8. David Croix & Philippe Michel, 2007. "Education and growth with endogenous debt constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(3), pages 509-530, December.
    9. Chen, Hung-ju, 2005. "Educational systems, growth and income distribution: a quantitative study," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 325-353, April.
    10. Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
    11. Zeira, Joseph, 1991. "Credit Rationing in an Open Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 959-972, November.
    12. Canton, Erik & Blom, Andreas, 2004. "Can student loans improve accessibility to higher education and student performance? An impact study of the case of SOFES, Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3425, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lochner, Lance & Monge-Naranjo, Alexander, 2014. "Student Loans and Repayment: Theory, Evidence and Policy," Working Papers 2014-40, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 12 Nov 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ex-post moral hazard; adverse selection; income contingent loans;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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