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Financing New Investments under Asymmetric Information: a General Approach

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  • Robin Boadway
  • Michael Keen

Abstract

We study the efficiency of credit market equilibria when financial intermediaries cannot observe the riskiness or the returns of potential investment projects. With loan financing, there is over-instrument in high-return, high-risk projects and under-investment in low-return, low-risk projects relative to the social optimum. If firms have the choice of equity finance, there is unambiguously over-investment under reasonable conditions. The well-known cases of Stiglitz and Weiss and of de Meza and Webb emerge as special cases. Policy implications are considered, and the results are extended to allow for signaling and screening equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2004. "Financing New Investments under Asymmetric Information: a General Approach," Cahiers de recherche 0407, CIRPEE.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Philipp Tillessen, 2003. "Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship in the Presence of Asymmetric Information in Capital Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 872, CESifo.
    2. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March.
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 455-470.
    5. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand & Marianne Vigneault, 1998. "Entrepreneurship, Asymmetric Information, and Unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 307-327, July.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    7. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claudio A. Piga & Gianfranco Atzeni, 2007. "R&D Investment, Credit Rationing And Sample Selection," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 149-178, April.
    2. Jörn Hendrich Block & Thorsten Staak & Philipp Tilleßen, 2007. "Ist das staatliche Eingreifen ins Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch legitimiert?," FEMM Working Papers 07007, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    3. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2006. "Self-Selection and Advice in Venture Capital Finance," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-06, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    4. Miglo, Anton, 2022. "Theories of financing for entrepreneurial firms: a review," MPRA Paper 115835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Cieply, S. & Dejardin, M.A.F.G., 2009. "Entrepreneurial Finance in France: The Persistent Role of Banks," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2009-056-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    6. Elena Del Rey & Bertrand Verheyden, 2008. "Loans, Insurance and Failures in the Credit Market for Students," Working Papers 359, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Fuest, Clemens & Tillessen, Philipp, 2005. "Why do governments use closed ended subsidies to support entrepreneurial investment?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 24-30, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit Markets; Asymmetric Information;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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