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The Need for More Flexibility in the Regulation of Smart Grids – Stakeholder Involvement


  • Christine Brandstätt
  • Gert Brunekreeft
  • Nele Friedrichsen


Energy and climate policy drive large scale integration of distributed generation and demand side management, with massive consequences for distribution grids. New technologies and actors shape the transformation of electricity networks towards smart systems. We argue that future regulation of smart grids needs to allow more flexibility. Firstly, the core of network monopoly starts to weaken allowing for more third party involvement. Secondly, the increasing number and heterogeneity of stakeholders makes “one-size-fits-all” regulation simply less suitable, whilst regulation needs to take account of various interests. In this paper we discuss stakeholder involvement and make policy recommendations to render regulation of smart systems more flexible.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Brandstätt & Gert Brunekreeft & Nele Friedrichsen, 2013. "The Need for More Flexibility in the Regulation of Smart Grids – Stakeholder Involvement," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0013, Bremen Energy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:bei:00bewp:0013

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Littlechild, Stephen C., 2012. "Australian airport regulation: Exploring the frontier," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 50-62.
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    9. Clastres, Cédric, 2011. "Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5399-5408, September.
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    11. Gunn, Calum & Sharp, Basil, 1999. "Electricity distribution as an unsustainable natural monopoly: a potential outcome of New Zealand's regulatory regime," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 385-401, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marius Buchmann, 2016. "Information Management in Smart Grids - the need for decentralized governance approaches," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0025, Bremen Energy Research.

    More about this item


    smart grids; regulation; information management; third-party involvement;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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